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The Impact of Republic of Argentina v. NML 
Capital, Ltd.:  Why the Supreme Court’s 
Ruling Against Argentina Avoided a Host of 
Unintended, Negative Consequences 
ELLEN GINSBERG SIMON
†





“How much easier it is to be critical than to be correct.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Concern over and criticism of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, LTD.
2
 has focused on fears 
that more creditors will be persuaded to hold out against bond 
restructuring deals in the future, successful debt exchanges will be 
more difficult to coordinate, and other restructuring efforts will end 
up similarly mired in litigation.  Detractors of the decision fail to 
 
 †  Ms. Simon is an Associate in the Baltimore office of DLA Piper LLP (US).  
Ms. Simon holds an A.B. from Brown University, an M.Phil. from the University 
of Oxford, and a J.D. from Harvard Law School.  The views set forth herein are the 
personal views of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the law firm 
with which she is associated. 
 ††  Mr. Crawford is a Partner in the Baltimore office of DLA Piper LLP (US).  
Mr. Crawford holds a B.A. from Bucknell University and a J.D. from the 
University of Chicago.  The views set forth herein are the personal views of the 
author and do not necessarily reflect those of the law firm with which he is 
associated. 
 1. 156 PARL. DEB., H.C. (3d ser.) (1860) 75-116 (U.K.) (statement of 
Benjamin Disraeli). 
2 573 U.S. ___ (2014). 
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consider, however, the myriad negative consequences had the 
Supreme Court ruled otherwise and read into the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act (“FSIA”) a nonexistent provision immunizing 
sovereigns from post-judgment discovery. Critics of the decision 
deflect attention from the actual ruling, which was limited in scope to 
a highly specific question of statutory interpretation: whether the 
FSIA immunizes a foreign-sovereign judgment debtor from post-
judgment discovery of information concerning its extraterritorial 
assets.  Instead, these critics substitute the Second Circuit’s and the 
District Court for the Southern District of New York’s findings that 
Argentina violated the pari passu clause and must make ratable 
payments to the minority holdout creditors, ignoring the actual 
content of the Supreme Court’s circumscribed decision. 
The case was not a referendum on sovereign debt restructuring 
and its appropriate mechanisms.  Concern about the potential 
ramifications of the Second Circuit’s ruling on sovereign debt 
restructuring is not sufficient reason to disregard the actual question 
before the Supreme Court, which comes attendant with its own 
ramifications in the world of judgment enforcement.  One must 
consider the alternative, negative consequences of such a ruling when 
passing judgment.  These unintended, negative consequences 
similarly would have threatened investor-state relations and parties’ 
abilities to reasonably rely on the enforceability of judgments in 
international arbitration and cross-border litigation.  While concerns 
about the deleterious effect of the District Court’s decisions may be 
valid, resolution of those apprehensions belongs to a different, more 
appropriate arena. 
This essay first explores the reasons the Supreme Court 
correctly interpreted the FSIA.  It examines the negative 
consequences of an alternative ruling, including the implications of a 
contrary decision on the ability to enforce judgments against 
international “bad actors” and the deleterious effect on international 
commerce.  It concludes with a review of more appropriate methods 
of addressing the problem of sovereign defaults proposed by several 
international financial organizations in the wake of the decision. 
II. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE 
The case originally stems from Argentina’s 2001 default on 
more than $80 billion in bonds.3  Over more than a decade later and 
 
 3. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina (Equal Treatment Case I), 699 
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after negotiating two debt exchanges in 2005 and 2010, Argentina 
had restructured its debt with approximately 91 percent of its 
creditors.4  One of the remaining holdout creditors was NML Capital, 
Ltd., a U.S. hedge fund associated with Elliott Associates that 
speculates in distressed debt.  Unable to reach a settlement, NML 
Capital brought 11 actions against Argentina in the Southern District 
of New York to collect on the defaulted bonds, alleging breach of 
contract and seeking injunctive relief.5  Jurisdiction was based on 
Argentina’s broad waiver of sovereign immunity in the bond 
indenture agreements.  NML Capital was successful in each action, 
and it sought to execute its judgments against Argentina.  This 
resulted in protracted litigation and multiple appeals to the Second 
Circuit.6 
On December 7, 2011, Judge Thomas Griesa ruled that 
Argentina breached the pari passu clause of its bond agreements by 
“relegating NML’s bonds to a non-paying class.”7  On February 23, 
2012, Judge Griesa granted injunctive relief to NML Capital, holding 
that Argentina violated the pari passu clause in its original bonds by 
its refusal to pay holdout creditors, by enacting laws impeding 
settlement, and by making official statements of defiance.8  Judge 
Griesa required Argentina to pay both the old and new bonds ratably, 
obligating Argentina to pay NML Capital and its co-plaintiffs full 
principal and past-due interest whenever it makes its periodic coupon 
payment on the restructured bonds.9  Argentina was enjoined from 
paying the restructured debt holders without also paying the holdouts 
who demand full payment plus interest.10  The order also threatened 
to sanction third parties, including exchange bondholders and 
 
F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 2012); CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS 
TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 10, 12 (2009). 
 4. Equal Treatment Case I, 699 F.3d at 252–53. 
 5. Id. at 253. 
 6. Emma Kingdon, Leveraging Litigation: Enforcing Sovereign Debt 
Obligations in NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 37 B.C. INT’L & COMP. 
L. REV. 30, 30–31 (2014); REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 3. 
 7. Order, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, ____(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 
2011) (No. 08 Civ. 6978), 2011 WL 9522565, at *2. 
 8. Order, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08 Civ. 6978 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2012) [hereinafter Feb. 23, 2012 Order]; Equal Treatment Case 
I, 699 F.3d at 254–55 (internal citations omitted). 
 9. Feb. 23, 2012 Order, supra note 8. 
 10. Id.  While affirming, the Second Circuit remanded the case for greater 
clarification of the terms of the injunction, and Judge Griesa provided clarification 
regarding the injunction in a subsequent opinion. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of 
Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012), on remand, 2012 WL 5895786 (S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 21, 2012) (stayed by the Second Circuit on Nov. 28, 2012). 
05 - CRAWFORDSIMON (DO NOT DELETE) 5/6/2015  10:47 AM 
58 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 30 
financial institutions both domestic and abroad, that might try to help 
Argentina pay the debt and prohibited Argentina from rerouting 
payments on the new bonds.11 
On October 26, 2012, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit unanimously upheld Judge Griesa’s finding that Argentina 
violated the pari passu clause and should make ratable payments, 
rejecting the U.S. government’s argument that the order would 
obstruct future attempts at debt restructurings and violated the 
FSIA.12  On August 23, 2013, the Second Circuit affirmed Judge 
Griesa’s formula for ratable payment, refusing to limit the territorial 
reach of Judge Griesa’s injunction.13 
Argentina appealed the decision to the Supreme Court in June 
2013, seeking review both on the substantive holding of the lower 
courts’ order requiring it to make ratable payments to the holdout 
creditors and on whether the District Court’s order violated the FSIA 
by permitting postjudgment discovery on third parties regarding 
Argentina’s extraterritorial assets.  While declining to review the 
former issue, the Supreme Court granted certiorari on the latter 
question.14  On June 16, 2014, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of 
NML Capital on the issue of postjudgment discovery.15 
III. THE POTENTIAL UNINTENDED NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF AN 
ALTERNATIVE DECISION 
A. The Supreme Court Correctly Interpreted the FSIA 
When divorced from the hype and rhetoric surrounding this case 
about the disproportionate power of so-called “vulture funds” 
threatening to derail future restructurings and taking advantage of 
debt crises at the expense of all other creditors willing to negotiate a 
debt exchange, the Supreme Court’s ruling was a simple matter of 
statutory interpretation of a much more limited topic.  It was a 
straightforward determination that the FSIA contains no provision to 
immunize foreign-sovereign judgment debtors from post-judgment 
discovery of information concerning their extraterritorial assets.  In 
 
 11. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 12. Equal Treatment Case I, 699 F.3d at 265. 
 13. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina (Equal Treatment Case II), 727 
F.3d 230, 237 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 14. See Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014). 
 15. See Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2250, 2254 
(2014). 
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this limited context, Justice Scalia’s opinion typifies a clean, strict 
reading of the statute, noting that, “the question. . .is not what 
Congress ‘would have wanted’ but what Congress enacted in the 
FSIA.”16  Analyzing the relevant statutory language, the opinion 
reviews the two immunity-conferring provisions it contains, which:  
(1) allow foreign states immunity from the jurisdiction of U.S. courts 
(which, the Court notes, Argentina waived and thus is “liable in the 
same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like 
circumstances”); and (2) provide that “the property in the United 
States of a foreign state shall be immune from attachment[,] arrest[,] 
and execution except as provided in sections 1610 and 1611 of this 
chapter.”17  The Court concludes that “[t]here is no third provision 
forbidding or limiting discovery in aid of execution of a foreign-
sovereign judgment debtor’s assets” and declines to “draw meaning” 
from this silence by reading absolute immunity from execution to 
equate with immunity from discovery in aid of execution.18  
Acknowledging that the creditors ultimately may not be able to 
execute the judgment against certain properties, Justice Scalia points 
out “that NML does not yet know what property Argentina has and 
where it is, let alone whether it is executable under the relevant 
jurisdiction’s law.”19 
Similar to many detractors of the opinion who worried about the 
policy implications for future sovereign debt restructurings, 
Argentina based its claim of immunity from post-judgment discovery 
largely on extra-legal arguments with which the U.S. Government 
concurred in its amicus brief.  These arguments related to 
international comity, the impact on international relations, and fears 
of reciprocal adverse treatment of the United States in foreign 
courts.20  They implicated concerns that “a United States court’s 
allowance of unduly broad discovery concerning a foreign state’s 
assets may cause the United States to be subjected to similar 
treatment abroad.”21 
The U.S. Government highlighted its concern about the 
implications on foreign relations should a foreign state’s property “be 
 
 16. Id. at 2258 (citing Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2160 
(1992)). 
 17. Id. at 2256 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(1), 1606, 1609 (2011)). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id.  
 20. Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae On Petition, 
Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014) (No. 12-842). 
 21. Id. at 11. 
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the subject of broad-ranging discovery, regardless of whether that 
property could be subject to execution in the United States.”22  In 
further attempting to argue that the FSIA supports its position, 
Argentina, echoed by the U.S. Government, conflated the concepts of 
the scope of discovery with the scope of attachment and execution 
under the statute.  In their desire to promote their policy objectives, 
they failed to distinguish these two, distinct issues, promoted a 
distorted reading of the FSIA, disregarded legislative history and 
amendments to the statute that support Justice Scalia’s understanding, 
and endorsed a changed understanding of the statute that would have 
resulted in more realistic and ultimately destructive policy 
implications. 
One of the central purposes of the FSIA is to ensure that the 
judicial system holds sovereign states accountable for their 
commercial activities.  The FSIA states this purpose in no uncertain 
terms:  “states are not immune from the jurisdiction of foreign courts 
insofar as their commercial activities are concerned, and their 
commercial property may be levied upon for the satisfaction of 
judgments rendered against them in connection with their commercial 
activities.”23  The FSIA is based on and codifies the U.S.’s long-
standing restrictive theory of immunity, which holds that public acts 
(jure imperii) of sovereign states are entitled to immunity while 
states’ private conduct and commercial acts (jure gestionis) are not.24  
Under the restrictive theory of immunity, states that subject 
themselves to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts through their commercial 
endeavors (as did Argentina through its own bond contract 
provisions) submit to normal judicial processes, including the 
discovery rules in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  In addition, 
numerous foreign jurisdictions also have codified this long-standing 
distinction for the purposes of immunity.25  Argentina’s 
understanding of the statute would have undermined a significant 
 
 22. Id. at 19. 
 23. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2014). 
 24. This theory has its earliest roots in The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, in 
which Justice Marshall, while adopting a broad form of state immunity at the time, 
also laid the foundational seeds for the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in 
his discussion of the distinction between armed public vessels such as the one in 
question and private merchant ships doing trade with the United States. 11 U.S. (7 
Cranch) 116 (1812). Thus, common law support for the distinction between the 
public acts of states as compared to commercial acts is centuries old.  
 25. Draft Articles on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, 
1991 (United Nations 2005), available at http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/ 
english/draft%20articles/4_1_1991.pdf; see also European Convention on State 
Immunity, May 16, 1972, ETS 74.  
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U.S. interest, enshrined in the statute itself, in enhancing the 
effectiveness of U.S. court judgments and the ability of parties to 
enforce those judgments abroad, while simultaneously upending 
traditional interpretation of the FSIA as well as centuries of common 
law and customary international law. 
Instead of hindering comity and reciprocity, the Supreme 
Court’s decision promotes these two worthwhile ends in several 
ways.  First, it supports the restrictive theory of immunity which 
enhances global commerce and champions the rule of law in 
international relations and the integrity of our court’s judgments to 
which Argentina contractually bound itself.26  Enforcement of valid 
judgments and encouraging respect for judgments emanating from 
U.S. courts is, in itself, a fundamental foreign relations interest.27  
Foreign sovereigns have no reasonable expectation of immunity 
under either the FSIA or international legal principles when they 
voluntarily enter the commercial arena.  States also have a reasonable 
expectation of the need to submit to the normal course of the judicial 
process (including discovery) once a court has jurisdiction either 
pursuant to immunity exceptions such as waiver or the commercial 
activity doctrine.28  Upsetting those reasonable expectations would, in 
 
 26. See Complaint at Exhibit A, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina 
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (No. 08 CIV 6978) (explaining that the waiver provision 
establishes the State of New York as the jurisdiction with venue over any disputes 
arising out of the agreement, stating in pertinent part, “The Republic hereby 
irrevocably and unconditionally waives, to the fullest extent permitted by law, any 
objection which it may now or hereafter have to the laying of venue of any 
aforesaid action arising out of or in connection with this Agreement brought in any 
such court has been brought in an inconvenient forum. . .The Republic hereby 
irrevocably waives and agrees not to plead any immunity from the jurisdiction of 
any such court to which it might otherwise be entitled in any action arising out of 
or based on the Securities or this Agreement by the holder of any Security.”). 
 27. Brief of Competitive Enterprise Institute & Former State Department 
Officials as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Republic of Argentina v. NML 
Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014) (No. 12-842). 
 28. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure possess adequate remedies to 
overcome any potential problems related to comity or reciprocity that arise in 
attempts to conduct post-judgment discovery, including the foreign sovereign’s 
ability to object on grounds of relevance or burdensomeness available to any other 
judgment debtor.  Courts can also weigh the risks of and foreign state’s interest in 
potential disclosure of sensitive information.  As Justice Scalia suggests in footnote 
6 of the opinion, any attempted discovery related to property that is per se exempt 
under international law from either attachment or execution or pursuant to treaty 
obligations that might pose a comity or reciprocity problem could be handled 
according to “settled doctrines of privilege and the discretionary determination by 
the district court whether the discovery is warranted, which may appropriately 
consider comity interests and the burden that the discovery might cause to the 
foreign state.” NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. at 2258 n.6 (quoting Societe Nationale 
Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court for Southern Dist. Of Iowa, 
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fact, have upset principles of international comity by undermining the 
validity of judicial decisions in cross-border litigation and by 
threatening litigants’ ability to rely on judgments rendered in such 
cases.  Argentina’s perversion of the FSIA’s plain language and 
content would have undermined the United States’ vital national 
interests in the rule of law, enforcement of valid judgments against 
foreign states, and respect for the U.S. judicial system. 
B. A Contrary Decision Would Have Been A Boon For 
International Bad Actors 
A decision barring post-judgment discovery based on sovereign 
immunity likely would immunize a number of bad actors in the 
international sphere from post-judgment discovery.  Such a decision 
would have imposed yet one more roadblock to the enforcement of 
many outstanding judgments against recalcitrant, uncooperative, and 
hostile nations, rogue states, and terrorist groups.29 
Litigants with judgments against Iran, Syria, the Russian 
Federation, and other states from which they seek to recover damages 
would have faced yet one more hurdle in an already difficult struggle 
to enforce judgments.  These states possess few if any attachable 
assets in the U.S. as a consequence of U.S. sanctions laws.  They also 
commonly and intentionally hide their assets in complex structures 
overseas.  Furthermore, they typically show contempt for U.S. 
discovery orders, refusing to recognize the U.S. court’s authority and 
to comply with any such orders. 
Such actors, which already have numerous unenforced 
judgments against them for their roles in terrorist attacks or in the 
illegal seizure of property, would have scored yet another victory and 
would have been given another tool to resist the enforcement of U.S. 
court judgments.  Many of the U.S. citizens who struggled for years 
to obtain judgments against states found liable for the deaths of their 
relatives or for illegal seizures of their property would lack the 
resources of an entity such as NML Capital to enforce those 
judgments if they were stripped of normal avenues of discovery to 
locate unidentified, attachable assets. 
 
482 U.S. 522, 543–44 n.28 (1987)).   
 29. See generally, Brief for Family Members and Estates of Victims of State-
Sponsored Terrorism as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Republic of 
Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014) (No. 12-842); see also 
Brief Amicus Curiae of Agudas Chasidei Chabad of United States in Support of 
Respondent, Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014) 
(No. 12-842). 
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This includes, for example, Agudas Chasidei Chabad of United 
States, which, after suing the Russian Federation and several Russian 
agencies under the FSIA, obtained a judgment to recover Chabad’s 
library that was seized in violation of international law during the 
October Revolution of 1917.30  Having obtained a default judgment 
and, later, a contempt sanction against the Russian Federation after it 
withdrew from the litigation claiming the court lacked jurisdiction, 
Chabad now seeks to enforce the judgment and contempt sanction.31  
This will require it to conduct discovery in the U.S. and abroad to 
locate attachable assets.  Had the Supreme Court decided in 
Argentina’s favor, Chabad and similarly situated litigants’ ability to 
conduct discovery would have been severely hampered and the 
injunctive order rendered useless.32  That result would have been 
highly damaging to the value, respect, and dignity of the U.S. judicial 
system. 
Similarly, several families of victims of state-sponsored terrorist 
attacks are seeking or already have been awarded judgments in U.S. 
courts.  This includes the families of victims of the September 11, 
2001 attacks on the U.S., who are suing the Sudan for its role in 
funding al Qaeda.33  Family members of Americans killed in the 1998 
U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania already have 
obtained judgments against the Sudan and Iran for their role in 
supporting the responsible terrorists.34  One family was awarded $38 
million in compensatory damages and $300 million in punitive 
damages against the Kurdistan Worker’s Party for its abduction of the 
late Ronald Wyatt.35 A district court in Illinois issued a judgment for 
$32 million in compensatory and $35 million in punitive damages 
against Iran for its support of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which 
perpetrated a terrorist attack on the Leibovitch family in 2003 
resulting in the murder of their child.36  Argentina’s proposed 
 
 30. Brief Amicus Curiae of Agudas Chasidei Chabad of United States in 
Support of Respondent, Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 
2819 (2014) (No. 12-842). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Brief for Family Members and Estates of Victims of State-Sponsored 
Terrorism as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 1, Republic of Argentina v. 
NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014) (No. 12-842) [hereinafter Brief for 
Family Members]. 
 34. Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 826 F. Supp. 2d 128, 157 (D.D.C. 2011); see 
also Brief for Family Members, supra note 33, at 2. 
 35. Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, 908 F. Supp. 2d 216, 220–21 (D.D.C. 
2012); see also Brief for Family Members, supra note 33, at 2. 
 36. Leibovitch v. Syrian Arab Republic, 2011 WL 444762 at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. 
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interpretation of the FSIA would have constrained these plaintiffs’ 
abilities to enforce valid judgments against international bad actors, 
undermining the value of U.S. court judgments and the integrity of 
our judicial system. 
Such an outcome, moreover, would have contravened Congress’ 
repeatedly affirmed intention of using the FSIA as a vehicle to hold 
terrorist-sponsoring states accountable for their crimes and to assist 
the victims of state-sponsored terrorism in their efforts to obtain 
justice.37  Congress repeatedly has amended the FSIA to support the 
enforcement of judgments against state sponsors of terrorism, going 
so far as to permit the attachment of diplomatic property and frozen 
assets in some circumstances, although presidential authority to 
waive attachment under this provision based on national security 
concerns has frustrated attempts to enforce it.38  Congress has 
instructed executive officials to assist terrorist victims in their efforts 
to locate attachable assets.39  Congress also passed the Victims of 
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 200040 to require 
liquidation of Cuban foreign assets to satisfy judgments and the 
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) of 200241 to limit the 
president’s ability to waive attachment of diplomatic property and 
frozen assets.42  Contrary to Argentina’s reading of the FSIA and its 
 
2011); see also Brief for Family Members, supra note 33, at 2–3. 
 37. Brief for Family Members, supra note 33, at 2–3; see also 28 U.S.C. § 
1610(f)(1)(A). 
 38. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(f)(1)(A); see, e.g., John R. Crook, U.S. Supreme Court 
Finds President’s Waiver of Terrorism Exception to Iraq’s Sovereign Immunity 
Bars Pending Cases, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 582, 583 (2009). 
 39. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (f)(2)(A). 
 40. 22 U.S.C. § 7101.  
 41. 28 U.S.C. § 1610. 
 42. See Brief for Family Members and Estates of Victims of State-Sponsored 
Terrorism as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 16-17, Republic of Argentina 
v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 2819 (2014) (No. 12-842); see also Victims of 
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No.106-386, § 2002, 114 
Stat. 1464, 1541 (Oct. 28, 2000); 28 U.S.C. § 1610 Note.  
For a detailed discussion of the history leading to the enactment of these statutes, 
see generally In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorist Litigation, 659 F.Supp.2d 31 
(D.D.C. 2009).  Victims have had limited success in attempts to invoke the relevant 
provisions of these acts, with several failing to obtain relief under the Terrorism 
Risk Insurance Act because the court found they waived their rights to attachment 
through acceptance of a pro rata compensation payment under the Victims of 
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000.  Nonetheless, the relevant 
provisions of the statutes have been acknowledged and applied by courts and 
continue to remain good law.  For recent examples of application and interpretation 
of these statutes, see, e.g., Ministry of Defense & Support for the Armed Forces of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran v. Elahi, 556 U.S. 366 (S. Ct. 2009); Cruz v. Maypa, 
2014 WL 6734848 (4th Cir. 2014); Hegna v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 402 F.3d 97 
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intent, time and again Congress has spoken unequivocally in favor of 
supporting the location of attachable assets while never limiting the 
means by which victims could conduct discovery to do so. 
C. A Contrary Decision Would Have Hindered International Trade 
and Commerce 
Rather than promoting foreign investment, a decision contrary to 
that reached by the Court would have hindered the international 
marketplace.  Investors, states, and markets require the predictability 
of the application of the rule of law.  Reinterpreting statutes such as 
the FSIA to support the shirking of commercial contractual 
obligations entered into by sovereign states and to deny the 
application of basic discovery rules undermines that predictability.  
Rather than undermining the United States’ comity and reciprocity 
interests, as argued by Argentina and the U.S. Government, the 
Court’s decision to uphold investors’ ability to conduct discovery in 
aid of judgment promotes those interests by encouraging states to 
stand by their commercial obligations and upholding a fundamental 
tenet of international law – the principle of pacta sunt servanda.43 
The U.S. has a significant interest in promoting other countries’ 
adherence to their self-imposed, commercial contractual obligations 
and other international agreements.  A state that proactively markets 
its bonds in the U.S. and then defaults on those bonds directly harms 
U.S. citizens.  Its default further harms its own citizens by raising the 
cost of their country’s debt.  Beyond the economic impact on these 
two populations is the overarching negative impact on commerce 
caused by a sovereign’s apparent ability to disregard its contractual 
obligations when faced with internal instability.  The message a 
contrary decision would have sent was to condone the overthrow of 
contractual provisions freely entered into by a sovereign entity as an 
easy solution to ineffective internal economic policies.  Domingo 
Cavallo, Argentina’s former minister of the economy who oversaw 
its 2001 debt restructuring, has publicly criticized how current 
Argentine President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner handled the 
country’s latest debt crisis and has advised compliance with Judge 
Griesa’s order.44  Instead of blaming vulture funds and a U.S. District 
 
(2nd Cir. 2005). 
 43. PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 70–71 (7th ed. 2006) (“treaties must be adhered to”). 
 44. See Landon Thomas Jr., Argentine Economist Says Bond Holdouts Should 
Be Paid, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2014, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/09/03/ 
argentine-economic-figure-urges-payments-to-bond-holdouts/?_r=0.  
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Court, Mr. Cavallo suggested that President Kirchner or a new 
government employ more responsible policies internally to stabilize 
the Argentine economy, stem capital flight, and use the returned 
capital to pay its investors.45  Mr. Cavallo further recommended that, 
instead of attacking the U.S. judicial system, the international 
community and the IMF need to revisit establishing a bankruptcy 
regime or mechanism for defaulting sovereigns.46 
Denying basic application of discovery rules would have proven 
restrictive of the marketplace, discouraging investors from taking a 
risk on investing in states that might easily turn around and invoke 
sovereign immunity to shirk their contractual obligations.  Denying 
discovery to plaintiffs would make international investment and debt 
purchases less attractive, more risky, and more expensive by 
alienating risk-averse investors and resulting in higher interest rates 
for the country’s own citizens. This outcome would neither have 
served Argentina’s long-term interests nor those of more responsible 
states seeking to attract investors.  Congress expressly designed the 
FSIA to protect the rights of holders of foreign sovereign debt by 
indicating that bond sales should be treated like other similar 
commercial transactions to avoid a situation in which a foreign state 
can shift the “burdens of the marketplace onto the shoulders of 
private parties.”47  If investors have no recourse to discover the 
foreign assets of and attempt to recover against governments that 
shirk their commercial obligations, what security will they have in 
making investments in the first place?  Put simply – if you cannot 
rely on or predict the rules of the game, you are less likely to play it.  
Congress cannot have intended for the FSIA to promote such a 
backward outcome. 
IV. CONCERNS ABOUT THE IMPACT OF THE LOWER COURTS’ RULINGS 
CAN AND SHOULD BE ADDRESSED IN MORE APPROPRIATE FORA 
International organizations, foreign governments, and even the 
U.S. government expressed concern about the far-reaching 
implications of Judge Thomas Griesa’s order enjoining Argentina 
from making payments on its restructured 2005 and 2010 debt 
without making ratable payments to holdout creditors including NML 
 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Judicial Education Project and Professors of 
Law in Support of Respondent, Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. 
Ct. 2819 (2014) (No. 12-842). 
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Capital, Ltd., the so-called “vulture fund” that rejected the 
restructuring deal.48  The decision has been heralded as a triumph for 
the “vulture fund” – a litigious minority – at the expense of the 93 
percent majority of creditors who accepted restructuring. 
Arguably, the bargaining power of potential holdouts has 
increased, while creditors contemplating an exchange offer must now 
also consider not only an expected reduction in their investment but 
also face the possibility of costly and protracted litigation by such 
emboldened holdouts.49  Such a result could doom future exchange 
offers to failure.  The reduction in financial incentives for creditors to 
join orderly debt restructurings may make such deals increasingly 
difficult to negotiate, especially in the case of the many outstanding 
bonds that currently have no collective action clauses (“CACs”).50  
Some have argued that the decision upends a traditional reading of 
the pari passu clause, threatens common understandings of 
restructuring techniques in practice for nearly a century, and bodes 
poorly for future attempts at sovereign debt restructuring.51  The 
decision has been described by experts in the field as having “shaken 
the sovereign universe,” with consequences that “spell the End of the 
World for sovereign immunity [and] sovereign debt as we know it.”52  
Columbia University economist Joseph E. Stiglitz has likened the 
situation to “America throwing a bomb into the global economic 
system,” noting that the problem extends beyond Argentina.53 
These concerns may well be valid and potent, but the context of 
the narrow, discovery-related question before the Supreme Court was 
not the appropriate forum for their consideration or resolution.  
Organizations from the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) to the 
International Capital Market Association (“ICMA”) have responded 
 
 48. Feb. 23, 2012 Order, supra note 8.  
 49. Lee C. Buchheit et al., Revisiting Sovereign Bankruptcy, Committee on 
International Economic Policy and Reform, BROOKINGS INST., Oct. 2013, at 18. 
 50. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, June 24, 2014, 
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 52. Anna Gelpern, Known Unknowns in Pari Passu. . .and More to Come, 
CREDIT SLIPS: A DISCUSSION ON CREDIT, FINANCE, AND BANKRUPTCY  
(Oct. 28, 2012), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2012/10/unknown-
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 53. Peter Eavis & Alexandra Stevenson, Argentina Finds Relentless Foe in 
Paul Singer’s Hedge Fund, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2014. 
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by looking anew at contractual remedies, changed lending policies, 
and concepts such as a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism to 
address the increasing problem of sovereign defaults in an 
international system that lacks a sovereign bankruptcy regime.  In 
December 2013 and in June 2014, the ICMA, a group that represents 
banks, lawyers, brokers and issuers in 53 countries, published a paper 
and a supplement recommending new terms for sovereign bonds in 
order to reduce the risk of future restructurings being held hostage by 
minority holdout creditors, as occurred in the case of Argentina, and 
to promote a more stable bond market.54  The ICMA paper suggests 
modifying a typical pari passu clause to ensure that it explicitly states 
that holdout creditors cannot expect guaranteed payment.  The IMF, 
too, has taken up this gauntlet, publishing papers on recent 
developments in sovereign debt restructuring and suggesting actions 
to address attendant problems.55  The IMF’s October 2014 paper, a 
self-described response to the case of Argentina and the Southern 
District of New York’s decisions which included input from the 
ICMA among others, recommends modification of the pari passu 
clause “in a manner that ensures that the type of remedy provided to 
holdout creditors in the case of Argentina would not be replicated in 
future cases.”56  The IMF paper recommends crafting such clauses to 
ensure that issuers are not required to pay creditors on an equal or 
ratable basis.  The paper recommends additional contractual reforms 
in the form of enhanced CACs that “include a more robust 
‘aggregation’ feature to address collective action problems more 
effectively.”57 
While these methods would take time to implement and likely 
would not demonstrate much impact for years to come, they are a 
superior route to addressing the problem of sovereign debt 
 
 54. ICMA Sovereign Bond Consultation Paper, INT’L CAPITAL MARKET ASS’N 
(Dec. 2013), http://www.icmagroup.org/resources/Sovereign-Debt-Information/. 
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the Fund’s Legal and Policy Framework, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Apr. 26, 2013), 
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Strengthening the Contractual Framework to Address Collective Action Problems 
in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Oct. 2014), 
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 56. Strengthening the Contractual Framework to Address Collective Action 
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restructuring than application of Argentina’s flawed claim to 
sovereign immunity.  The problem of a lack of international regime 
to handle sovereign debt crises likely will and should be addressed 
through application of economic policy, international negotiation, 
treaty, contract clause, and various other methods that avoid creating 
a host of new problems by undermining the FSIA, the legitimacy of 
U.S. court judgments, and fundamental discovery rules while 
simultaneously discouraging foreign investment in a system where 
investors cannot rely on their contractual agreements or the rule of 
law. 
V. CONCLUSION 
While the international financial community continues to face 
the problem of increasing numbers of defaulting states without any 
rules or overarching regime to govern these crises, Argentina v. NML 
Capital was not the appropriate venue for resolving the many issues 
surrounding sovereign default.  Rather, under the circumstances of 
this case, had the Supreme Court allowed Argentina to circumvent 
the strict reading of the FSIA based on its foreign policy arguments, 
it would not have protected investor-state relations or strengthened 
the international arbitration and litigation regimes: it would have 
undermined those processes.  Future sovereign debtors are not left 
without recourse by the Court’s decision.  Instead, states may begin 
to adopt stronger, more effectively-crafted collective action clauses 
and other contractual terms when issuing sovereign debt.  The 
Court’s refusal to create an exception for sovereign debtors may also 
lead to renewed discussions of a sovereign debt restructuring 
mechanism.  Those avenues represent more sound solutions that will 
neither undermine national and international legal principles nor 
trigger a host of unintended, negative consequences for the rule of 
law and the international marketplace. 
